Multiple Job-Holding as a Strategy for Skills Diversification and Labour Market Mobility by Panos, Georgios et al.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984075
 
 
 
The CER Working Paper Series on 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
ISSN 2048-2426 
 
 
 
 
WP4 
Multiple Job Holding as a Strategy for Skills 
Diversification and Labour Market Mobility  
 
by 
 
Georgios Panos 
Konstantinos Pouliakas 
Alexandros Zangelidis 
 
Number of Pages: 30  
 
CENTRE FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 
 Essex Business School 
University of Essex 
Elmer Approach 
Southend-on-Sea, Essex 
SS1 1LW, UK 
Tax: +44 1702 328387 
www.essex.ac.uk/ebs/research/cer 
General correspondence to jmitra@essex.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External Advisors: 
Prof David Smallbone 
Prof Mathew Manimala 
Prof Gunnar Prause 
 
 
 
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1984075
The CER working Paper Series on Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multiple Job Holding as a Strategy for Skills Diversification  
and Labour Market Mobility 
August 2011 
Georgios Panos 
Konstantinos Pouliakas 
Alexandros Zangelidis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: 
Dr Georgios Panos 
Essex Business School 
University of Essex 
Elmer Approach, Southend-on-Sea 
Essex, SS1 1LW UK 
Tel: +44 1702 328384, Fax + 44 1702 328387 
Email: gpanos@essex.ac.uk  
  
The CER working Paper Series on Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 II 
 
 
 
Table of Content 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ 1 
Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2 
Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 3 
The Data .............................................................................................................................. 4 
Statistical Methodology ........................................................................................................ 6 
Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 15 
References ........................................................................................................................ 16 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................ 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series on Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Page 1 of 33 
 
Abstract  
 
The inter-related dynamics of dual job-holding, human capital and occupational choice 
between primary and secondary jobs are investigated, using a panel sample (1991-2005) 
of UK employees from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). A sequential profile of 
the working lives of employees is examined, investigating, first, the determinants of 
multiple job-holding, second, the factors affecting the occupational choice of a secondary 
job, third, the relationship between multiple-job holding and job mobility and, lastly, the 
spillover effects of multiple job-holding on occupational mobility between primary jobs. The 
evidence indicates that dual job-holding may facilitate job transition, as it may act as a 
stepping-stone towards new primary jobs, particularly self-employment.         
 
Keywords: Moonlighting, Occupational Choice, Human Capital, Mobility.  
 
JEL Classification Codes: J22, J24, J62 
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Introduction 
 
The shift to greater labour market flexibility in recent years (Harrison, 1998) has led to 
lowering employer-employee loyalty, rising unemployment risk and far shorter job 
durations compared to the past (OECD, 1997; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995; 1999). In the 
face of these changes, the need on behalf of individuals to seek for alternative ways of 
ensuring employment security and a continuous and higher income stream has become 
paramount.  In addition, with rapid technological changes requiring continuous skills 
updating and lifelong learning, occupational mobility has come to command a higher return 
in modern job markets (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996; European Commission, 2002; 
EurActiv, 2010).  In coping with the above volatility, a large number of workers have thus 
been required to foster an active strategy of multiple job-holding or moonlighting (Bell et al., 
1997; Farber, 1998; Neumark, 2000).  
 
Multiple job-holding can act as a means of tackling financial constraints, ensuring 
uninterrupted employment spells and as a conduit for further career progression via the 
accumulation of necessary occupational expertise.  The phenomenon of moonlighting has 
become an important characteristic of the British labour market during the time period of 
exacerbating labour market flexibility.  An examination of the employment data over recent 
years suggests that since 1995 more than 1.2 million people in the UK have held multiple 
jobs (Simic and Sethi, 2002). Böheim and Taylor (2004) report that moonlighting rates are 
about 8-10% for the UK labour market for the period 1991 and 1998.  Importantly, the 
number of people holding second jobs increased by 68% between 1984 and 2001, a 
disproportionate rise compared to the increase in the number of people in employment 
over the same period of 18%.  
 
Despite the increasing incidence of moonlighting as another facet of atypical employment, 
the issue remains fairly under-researched with most available studies focusing exclusively 
on the determinants of the decision to moonlight (Perlman, 1966; Bell et al., 1997; Conway 
and Kimmel, 1998; Böheim and Taylor, 2004; Dickey and Theodossiou, 2006; Renna and 
Oaxaca, 2006; Wu et al. 2008). However, with the notable exception of Paxson and 
Sicherman (1996), the literature has been surprisingly silent with respect to the important 
role of multiple job-holding as facilitator of skills accumulation and as determinant of the 
job/occupational transition process.   
 
A close examination of the links between occupational experience, the incidence of 
moonlighting and job/occupational mobility, however, is crucial not only for a fuller 
understanding of individual income growth and career progression, but for the purposes of 
future labour market policy design as well.  Multiple job-holding also has wider implications 
on employee health, productivity, work-life balance and overall well-being.  
 
The aim of this study is to examine the links between multiple job-holding and job and 
occupational mobility using a panel sample of male employees observed over 15 years 
(1991-2005) in the UK.  The empirical strategy benefits from techniques that take into 
consideration the dynamic character of moonlighting and simultaneously allow for 
individual-specific effects in outcome equations of occupational choice, defined over non-
random sub-populations of moonlighters and job-movers. The evidence suggests that non-
transferable occupation-specific experience and financial constraints are contributing 
factors towards the selection of similar occupations in the primary and secondary jobs by 
individuals who decide to moonlight.  Nonetheless, those who eventually switch to a 
different occupation in their second job, relative to their first one, are more likely to be 
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occupationally mobile in their primary job in the future, exhibiting a particular tendency to 
move into self-employment.   
 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of the available literature on the economics of multiple job-holding, drawing out any 
implications for job and occupational mobility.  Section 3 describes the data, while Section 
4 outlines the empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the main empirical results and, finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
Literature Review 
 
The literature on multiple job-holding has identified four main potential motives behind 
moonlighting activities (Böheim and Taylor, 2004; Wu et al., 2008).  The early empirical 
research focuses primarily on the “hours constraints” motive and suggests that the 
predominant explanation for multiple job-holding is financial need, i.e. multiple-job holding 
is used as a survival strategy for low income households.  According to the standard 
labour-leisure model, employees may be hours constrained, i.e. willing to work more but 
not being offered the chance to do so in their primary occupation (Perlman, 1966).  As the 
willingness to work more hours is related to the provision of low or insufficient wages in the 
first job, this is also often referred to as the financial motive.  A number of empirical studies 
have found an association between the level of a worker’s earnings and the propensity to 
moonlight, showing that as the level of earnings in the primary job rises the incidence of 
multiple job-holding declines (Hamel, 1967; Guthrie, 1969; Shisko and Rostker, 1976; 
Krishnan, 1990).  Böheim and Taylor (2004) also find evidence that a permanent contract 
reduces the chances of holding a second job, suggesting an association between job 
security and moonlighting.  However, in a recent study Robinson and Wadsworth (2007) 
fail to find that the introduction of the minimum wage in the UK had any significant impact 
on the decision to moonlight.  
 
Apart from financial constraints, the literature has identified some additional motives for 
moonlighting.  Heineck and Schwarze (2004) provide evidence that workers may take up a 
second job for other monetary benefits, acquisition of new skills or to gain experience in 
alternative occupations.  In addition, employees may choose to find a second job in order 
to smooth their consumption, or as an alternative to precautionary savings, even if they are 
not experiencing immediate negative financial shocks (Guariglia and Kim, 2004).  
Furthermore, individuals might derive different sources of satisfaction from the first and the 
second job. In other words, job heterogeneity might provide a motivation to moonlight on 
its own, such as singing in a band during the evening (Böheim and Taylor, 2004).  This is 
the so-called heterogeneity motive (Kimmel and Conway, 2001; Renna and Oaxaca, 2006).   
 
The above arguments imply that apart from securing a continuous income stream and 
hedging against the risk of primary job loss, individuals may choose to take up a second 
job to learn about new occupations, to gain training or new credentials, to engage in 
activities of interest to them which provide satisfaction not received from the primary job, or 
to maintain flexible work schedules (e.g. a woman who requires childcare may take up two 
part-time jobs).   
 
The literature also highlights some other interesting patterns governing the moonlighting 
phenomenon. Alden (1971) finds a higher incidence of multiple job-holding in the rural 
regions of the UK. He also shows that self-employment is the predominant form of 
employment in a secondary job.  Lundberg (1995) investigates moonlighting in the context 
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of a job with amenities and argues that multiple job-holding can be explained by individuals 
having some emotional or other attachment to a specific sector or job that would lead them 
to turn down offers of higher earnings in other sectors.  Krishnan (1990) explores how a 
husband’s decision to moonlight is affected by his wife’s decision to work, and finds that 
increased participation by wives deters multiple job-holding.  Kimmel and Powell (1999) 
find that gender and marital status also appear to affect the decision of multiple job-holding, 
with women, those who are never married and young individuals more likely to take up 
second jobs.  Alden and Spooner (1982) highlight gender differences in the preferences 
over the type of second job, with females tending to be paid employees, as opposed to 
men who are mostly self-employed in their second job.  In contrast, Averett (2001) finds no 
substantive differences in the factors that lead men and women to moonlight. 
 
While a large part of the literature favours the “hours constraints” explanation, particularly 
for the developed world, little evidence has been presented on the view of multiple job-
holding as a hedging strategy.  Bell et al. (1997) find little evidence of behaviour of this 
type in the UK.  They suggest that since moonlighting is more of a persistent/permanent 
phenomenon, this constitutes evidence in favour of the job heterogeneity explanation.  In 
contrast, evidence from transition economies suggests that dual job-holding is more likely 
to be transitory and correlated with future job mobility. Guariglia & Kim (2006) find that 
moonlighting in Russia is transitory and is generally associated with career shifts, often 
tending towards self-employment.  This finding is in agreement with the view of the 
secondary labour market or the informal sector acting as a potential effective incubator for 
setting up new self-employed businesses, by fostering the development of new human 
capital (Levenson and Maloney, 1998; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2011).  
 
In an interesting unifying framework, Paxson and Sicherman (1996) introduce a stochastic 
dynamic model where the decisions to take a second job and change primary job are 
taken simultaneously.  According to the authors, the “hours constraints” explanation can 
lead to a dynamic process of moonlighting and job mobility. Workers who want to work 
more search for a portfolio of jobs that provide desirable bundles of characteristics.  They 
may then use dual job-holding to learn about new occupations or to gain training. 
Moonlighting can thus facilitate the process of transition to a different occupation.  
The Data 
 
This study uses fifteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS, 1991-2005)1 
to examine the links between occupational experience, multiple job-holding, job mobility 
and occupational choice.  The BHPS is a nationally representative household survey 
providing rich information on individual demographic, socioeconomic and work-related 
characteristics.  Importantly, it identifies individuals who hold more than one job by asking 
“Do you earn any money from (a second job) odd jobs or from work that you might do from 
time to time (apart from your main job)?”  
 
Figure 1 plots rates of dual job-holding by year vis-à-vis the official rates of unemployment, 
measured both in terms of benefit claimant rates per government region and local 
unemployment rates.  The figure verifies that women are more likely to hold multiple jobs 
                                                           
1
 The BHPS data was made available through the ESRC Data Archive. The data was originally collected by 
the ESRC Research Centre on Micro-social Change, at the University of Essex. The original collectors of the 
data, the Data Archive and the affiliated institutions bear no responsibility for the analysis or interpretations 
presented here. 
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than men (by almost two percentage points).  The male rates are between 7% and 10%, 
increasing in the first half of the panel and reaching a maximum in 1997.  The trend 
declines after that year, reaching a figure close to 7% by 2005.  Echoing the evidence on 
the pro-cyclicality of moonlighting in the U.S (Partridge, 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Kimmel, 2009), the BHPS dual job-holding line also seems to parallel the unemployment 
line quite closely, with a rising trend until 1997 that is reversed thereafter. 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here] 
The empirical analysis of the paper employs an unbalanced sample of males in paid 
employment, aged between 18 and 60 at the time of the interview.  The reason for keeping 
male employees only is that women are more likely to undertake secondary job tasks for 
immediate financial reasons or due to family responsibilities (Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel, 
2009).  An additional criterion for inclusion in the analysis is the presence of males in the 
sample for at least three years, which is employed in order to enable the use of dynamic 
models. The average statistical life in the sample is 9.7 years.  The sample is comprised of 
5,590 individuals (37,772 observations).  There are 3,211 spells of dual job-holding in the 
data, by 1,221 individuals.  This is suggestive of the persistent nature of multiple job-holding 
in the U.K (Bell et al., 1997; Böheim and Taylor, 2004), as a large number of individuals are 
engaged in a second job for more than one year during the sample life.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for primary and secondary job characteristics in the 
sample.  On average, 8.5% of the employed male sample is occupied in a second job.  52.5% 
of these dual job-holders are in paid employment in their second job, while the remainder 
are in self-employment.  61.9% hold a second job for two consecutive years (serial 
moonlighters).  The average gross monthly salary in the primary occupation is £1,329 for an 
average of 39 hours of work per week.  The average salary in the second job appears to be 
much lower, i.e. £210 for an average of 24 hours per month.  Both the figures for earnings 
and hours of work in the second job entail very large standard deviations.  
 
A first examination of the 1-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes2 in the 
primary and secondary jobs suggests that the proportion of people who work as 
“Managers & administrators”, “Plant & machine operatives” and in “Clerical & secretarial 
occupations” in their secondary occupation is significantly lower compared to the 
respective groups in the primary occupation.  There appears to be a higher incidence of 
lower-skilled occupations in the second job, such as “Associate professional & technical”, 
“Personal & protective service”, and “Other occupations”.  It is thus of great interest to 
examine the factors that affect the decision of individuals whether to conduct the same or 
different types of jobs between their primary and secondary employment.    
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents sample averages for individual and work-related characteristics. Panel (A) 
is for the pooled sample of both dual job-holders and individuals working in a single job.  
Panel (B) presents sample means for single job and dual job-holders, respectively, along 
with significance levels from a standard t-test of mean differences.  Finally, Panel (C) 
introduces another distinction of interest between individuals doing the same occupation in 
their primary and secondary job, and those doing a different one.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
                                                           
2
 The robustness of the findings presented in the following sections was examined using more detailed 
distinctions, such as 2-digit and 3-digit level differences.  The results are robust, and the choice of the 1-digit 
level distinction is made in order to facilitate the presentation of the output.  
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Table 2 indicates that dual job-holders are earning significantly lower (hourly or monthly) 
wages in their primary job.  Moreover, 13.2% of dual job-holders are found in the low-paid 
group, defined as those earning less than two thirds of the median earnings in the sample.  
The respective figure is 7.9% for those employed solely in one job.  Single job-holders are 
also more likely to have a higher household income and are less likely to be “relatively 
poor” (i.e. report equivalised household income less than two thirds of the sample median).  
Dual job-holders are less likely to be married and to have an employed partner if married.  
They are younger on average and have lower labour market experience, occupational-
specific experience3 and job tenure.  They work less hours on average in their primary 
occupation, both in terms of normal weekly hours and paid overtime.  However, they are 
more likely to want to work more hours in that job, which is indicative of hours constraints.   
 
A raw inspection of job transitions suggests that 4.1% of dual job-holders switch to self-
employment as a primary job in the next year, compared to 2.1% of non-moonlighters. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, 14.2% of moonlighters move 
to a new job with a new employer, compared to 11.5% of non-moonlighters, and are less 
likely to remain in the same position with the same employer. These patterns suggest that 
there is a relationship between dual job-holding and job mobility.  It is important to notice, 
though, that the rates of transition to unemployment and inactivity do not differ significantly 
between dual and single job-holders.  
 
In terms of occupational choices, the sample averages in Panel (C) of Table 2 suggest that 
those dual job-holders doing the same occupation in their primary and secondary job are 
more likely to be wealthier and to have higher job tenure and occupational experience.  
The groups more likely to diversify between the two jobs are those in unskilled occupations 
in their primary jobs.  In the first instance, the differences with respect to future job 
transitions are found to be statistically insignificant between individuals diversifying in their 
primary and secondary jobs.  
Statistical Methodology 
 
In investigating the determinants of the occupational choice at the second job, and the 
implications of the latter for subsequent job and occupational mobility, a number of 
important statistical issues arise that can be conceptualized as two distinct individual 
decisions.  First, the analysis focuses on modeling the discrete binary choice of taking up a 
secondary occupation that is different from the one in the primary job.  This is done in 
order to examine how such occupational choices are related to the various motives for 
moonlighting that were described in Section 2 above. Second, the interest turns to 
examining the potential links between the primary-secondary occupational choices of 
individuals at time period t and their subsequent labour market mobility and occupational 
decisions in the next period (t+1). For both set of issues the econometric methodology 
pays particular attention to the potential incidental selection problem that arises, given that 
in the first case the sample is comprised of dual job-holders only, whilst in the second the 
                                                           
3
 The creation of the occupational-specific experience variable in the BHPS stems from the detailed work of 
Zangelidis (2008a). Occupational experience measures the total amount of time an individual has spent in 
his current occupation from the time he/she first entered the job market. The variable is constructed at the 1-
digit level of occupation classification. Part-time and full-time paid employment spells of only salary workers 
are taken into consideration. The spells of occupational experience do not necessarily have to be continuous. 
Missing values have been imputed based on a regression model of the length of accumulated occupational-
specific experience (available upon request).  
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sample is a non-random representation of individuals who have switched jobs.  The next 
two sections describe the statistical methodology employed in the study.      
1 The Profile of the Dual Job-Holder and Occupational Choice 
Following the decision to take-up multiple jobs, individuals are likely to engage in a 
discrete choice of whether to select a secondary occupation that is different from the one 
in the primary job.  On the one hand, undertaking a similar occupation in a second job as 
in the primary one may allow individuals to benefit from the specialization that may result 
from the accumulation of occupational-specific skills. This may constitute an optimal 
response, especially in the face of financial constraints that may be the motivating factor 
underlying the decision to moonlight.  On the other hand, performing a secondary job that 
deviates from the original one may foster the building-up of a different stock of skills that 
may encourage the transition to a different occupation in the future.    
 
This decision can be formally represented as follows:  
  1
x
′ θ  α    0,     1, … , N;   2, … , T  (1) 
  1

  z
′ β       !  0   (2) 
where in equation (1), the main equation of interest, the dependent variable, , is a 
binary variable that takes the value of one for those who do an secondary occupation that 
is different from the one in their primary job (based on the 1-digit SOC), and zero 
otherwise.    is assumed to depend on a vector of regressors, " , and on a 
composite error term, #  $   , where $  is a term capturing unobserved individual-
specific effects with %$|' ( 0  and   is a random error term with %|'  0 .  
Importantly,   is only observed if   1 , where   is an indicator (selection) 
variable for individual i being a dual job-holder at time period t, ) is a vector of explanatory 
variables () * " for identification purposes) and      + is a composite error term with 
! , -.0, /01, %!|2  0.  The time-invariant fixed effects term,   , is assumed to 
account for potential omitted variable bias in the model, % |2 ( 0 , and is also 
responsible for serial correlation in . 
 
Equations (1) and (2) take into account a number of important elements that are likely to 
characterize the economic problem that individuals face.  First, the term  is included 
in Equation (2) to capture the effect of state dependence which has been identified as a 
typical characteristic of the decision to moonlight (Bell et al., 1997; Böheim and Taylor, 
2004). Second, it has been deemed necessary to account for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity in the form of time-invariant fixed effects ($ in Equation 1 and   in Equation 
2), since there are important unobserved factors that may affect both the decision to 
moonlight and the subsequent occupational choice of a secondary job.  For instance, it 
may be argued that less risk-averse individuals are more likely to engage in multiple job-
holding, or to select a different occupational track as a secondary job choice. Third, a 
correction for potential sample selection bias is required in order to obtain consistent 
parameters in Equation 1, since estimation of the main outcome equation is conditional on 
the potentially non-random subpopulation of those individuals who decide to moonlight 
(Equation 2) (Heckman, 1979).   
 
In order to address the above issues, Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge 
(2005) have proposed a suitable Conditional Maximum Likelihood (CML) estimation 
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procedure.  Specifically, following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984) it is initially 
assumed that the correlation between    and 2 can be parameterized via a linear 
relationship,    23′4  5, where 5 , - .0, /61 , %5|2, !  0 and 23 are the means 
over the sample period of all exogenous variables.  Equation (2) is therefore expressed as:  
  1
z
′ β  γ  23
′4  5  ε  0,     1, … , N;   2, … , T   (3) 
As argued by Chamberlain (1984), estimation of the likelihood function requires an 
assumption about the relationship between the initial observations, 7, and 5. Assuming 
linearity 5  58  57  9, Wooldridge (2005) has shown that a procedure that entails 
the addition of the initial value,   , and the means of the time-varying exogenous 
regressors into the main specification (1) can lead to consistent estimation parameters:4 
  1
z
′ β  γ  23
′4  58  5  9  ε  0,     1, … , N;   2, … , T (4) 
Wooldridge postulates further that since the errors in the selection equation,  : 
58  9  ! , and   are independent of 23  and : , .;0, /<1= and %|23 , :  >: , 
the conditional expectation of $ can be expressed as a linear function of 23  and :  as 
follows: 
%$|23, :  23?  @>%:|23,   1  (5) 
which results in the following model of the outcome equation: 
  1
x
′ θ  23?  ABC    0   (6) 
where A  @>, C  z′ β  γ  23′4  5 and BC 
DEFG
ΦEFG
 is the inverse 
Mill’s ratio with φ(.) denoting the standard normal density and (.)Φ is the standard 
cumulative normal distribution function. 
 
For the estimation of equation (6), Wooldridge recommends that separate probit 
regressions are estimated on the selection equation (4) per each year t from which BC 
is obtained (correcting the standard errors for robustness).  In the second step, equation (6) 
may then be consistently estimated by a pooled OLS regression (with bootstrapped 
standard errors).5  
  
    2  Dual Job-Holding, Job Mobility and Occupational Choice in the New Job 
 
The choice of primary and secondary job is likely to significantly affect the mobility of 
individuals via the accumulation of occupation-specific skills that it entails.  As shown by 
Shaw (1987), in a world of perfect information the probability of employer or occupational 
                                                           
4
 Heckman (1981) had initially proposed as a solution to the initial conditions problem the specification of a 
linearized reduced form equation for the initial period. However, this method requires a set of exogenous 
instruments for identification of the full observed sequence 7, … , 7 given ' . In contrast, Wooldridge’s 
(2005) suggestion of modeling the density of 71, … , 7  conditional on 7, '  minimizes both the 
estimation complexity and the computational cost (Stewart, 2007, p. 516). 
5
 Other related procedures that have been suggested to tackle the above econometric problem include 
Kyriazidou (1997) and Dustmann and Rochina-Barrachina (2007).  Applications of these methods can also 
be found in Jones and Labeaga (2003) and Jackle (2007). 
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change increases with the transferability of human capital.  Furthermore, imperfect 
knowledge of the “match” between one’s abilities and the job requirements is likely to 
facilitate a move to an unrelated occupation.  An additional job, especially one that is 
distinct to the primary occupation, is therefore likely to enhance the prospect of labour 
market mobility, by affecting the available stock of occupation-specific skills and/or by 
alleviating the uncertainty regarding the worker-job match.  
 
The focus of interest therefore now turns to examining how the occupational diversification 
between primary and secondary jobs at time period t affects the subsequent labour market 
decisions of individuals in the next period (t+1), both in terms of their mobility to a new 
primary job and with respect to the occupational choice made.  A similar framework to the 
one used in Section 4.1 is employed: 
H  1
x
′ θ  α    0,     1, … , N;   2, … , T  (7) 
 I  1
I
  z
′ β     !  0   (8) 
where H  is now a binary variable taking the value of one if individuals in a new 
primary job at time t+1 are doing an occupation different from their primary job in the 
previous period (t).  As before, an incidental truncation problem arises as this variable is 
only observed for those individuals who decided to change their primary employment, i.e. 
I  = 1. The Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) methodology is 
utilized again so that the estimation of equations (7) and (8) proceeds as follows6:  
H  1
x
′ θ  23?  ABC    0  (9) 
p  1
z
′ β  23
′4  9  ε  0    (10) 
 
Empirical Results  
 
1 The Profile of the Multiple Job-Holder 
 
The results presented in Table 3 are based on estimation of equation (4), the selection 
equation identifying the likelihood of individuals engaging in multiple job-holding. Apart 
from the terms that account for state dependence and the initial condition (Moonlighting(t-1), 
Moonlighting(Year1)), the specification controls for the local unemployment rate (by 
administrative region), and the logarithms of equivalised household income in the year 
prior to the survey, labour market experience, occupation-specific experience, job tenure, 
weekly working hours, paid overtime hours, and number of children. Moreover, the list of 
explanatory variables includes dummy variables capturing whether an individual wants to 
work more or less hours in the primary job, marital/cohabitation status and partner’s 
employment status, education (7 groups), and occupation in the primary job (9 groups). 
Finally, additional variables are included that control for private sector, permanent job, 
promotion prospects, and annual earnings increments in the primary job. A convenient 
way of interpreting the coefficients is to consider the estimated joint effect of the mean 
terms of the variables (Mundlak terms) and the level variables as the “permanent” effect of 
                                                           
6
 Due to the absence of any theoretical justification, no dynamic terms were used in this model. 
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the regressors on the decision to hold a second job7. The coefficients on the level of the 
variables represent instead the response to a “transitory” change in these variables.  
 
Overall the results highlight some important patterns regarding the motives of the decision 
to moonlight. First, there is significant evidence in favour of the financial or hours-
constraint motive, as it is clear that individuals’ household income in the previous period 
(i.e. the period in which the decision to moonlight is likely to be made) exerts a negative 
effect on the probability of currently holding a second job.  Furthermore, individuals who 
would prefer to work more hours in their present primary job are more likely to hold a 
second job compared to those who are content with their existing state of working hours.  
The opposite is also found for those who would like to work less hours.  In addition, 
although the total number of contracted hours of work in the primary job does not affect the 
moonlighting decision, the number of paid overtime hours, which can act as an alternative 
response of individuals to financial constraints, is found to have a negative and significant 
effect on multiple job-holding8.  Individuals with promotion prospects in their primary job 
and those who receive annual increments in their salary are also less likely to have a 
second job. 
 
At a more aggregate level the positive effect of the current local unemployment level 
suggests that individuals respond to a negative demand shock, such as an increase in the 
unemployment rate, by obtaining a second job as an insurance shield against increased 
labour market uncertainty. Interestingly, the negative effect of the mean of the local 
unemployment rate on the probability of holding a second job suggests a supply side 
reaction of the labour market, as regions with high mean unemployment are likely to have 
a low incidence of dual job-holding due to the limited availability of jobs.    
 
Though no temporary effects of the variables marital status, employment status of the 
spouse, and number of children are found, presumably due to their low variation over time, 
their mean effects are statistically significant. This suggests that they exert a permanent 
effect on the decision to hold a second job. Single people are found to be more likely to 
engage in moonlighting. A greater number of children, presumably due to the increased 
associated financial burden, is found to exert a positive impact on the decision to hold a 
second job.  Furthermore, educational9 and occupational differences appear to explain 
very little of the variation in the decision to hold an additional job, although the evidence is 
indicative that lower-skilled occupations are more conducive to moonlighting.     
 
The estimated model includes controls for both the multiple job-holding status of the 
individuals in the previous year as well as in the year they first appeared in the sample.  
Both variables are estimated to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
decision to hold a second job in the current period, suggesting that the incidence of 
multiple job-holding contains a permanent labour market element.  Given the evidence of 
its persistent dynamic nature, it is difficult to rationalize that multiple job-holding is a 
temporary individual response to financial shocks.  Nonetheless, the permanency of 
                                                           
7
 The joint effect is calculated as a point estimate and standard error of the linear constraint that the 
summation of the level and the mean effect is equal to zero, for each of the variables in the Mundlak terms 
separately.  
8
 Previous research finds that the overtime premium has an ambiguous effect on the probability of 
moonlighting (Renna, 2006). 
9
 An alternative model specification was also employed, where controls for education were not included in 
the regression to avoid potential collinearity with the occupational variables. No notable changes in effects 
were observed.  
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moonlighting is consistent with previous findings of the literature that have showed that 
low-paid workers (who are more likely to engage in multiple job-holding) are typically 
trapped in a “low-pay/no pay” vicious cycle (Webb et al., 1996; Machin, 1999; Stewart, 
1999; Stewart and Swaffield, 1999; Dickens, 2000; TUC, 2007).       
 
Finally, the significant negative coefficients of a constructed measure of occupation-
specific experience (Zangelidis, 2008a) and of (mean) employer-tenure implies that 
employees with a greater set of specific skills, who are likely to enjoy higher (wage) returns 
from a first job (Zangelidis, 2008a and 2008b; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009; Williams, 
2009), will be less in need of performing a secondary job.  Interestingly, the level effect of 
tenure (transitory effect) implies that as individuals gain seniority in their current 
employment they are more likely to hold a second job. This finding may be potentially 
explained by the unwillingness of individuals to search for a second job in the initial or 
probationary period of employment.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
2 Multiple Job-Holding and Occupational Choice  
Conditional on the determinants of dual job-holding shown in Table 3, the analysis now 
turns to the occupational choices of those who decide to have a second job i.e. the 
estimation of Equation (6).   
 
The results of a Linear Probability estimator are presented in Table 410 . The list of 
explanatory variables is similar to that of Table 3, with the exception of the dynamic terms, 
and the addition of year fixed effects (i.e. dummy variables for each wave) in accordance 
to the methodology described in Section 4.1 for the occupational choice model. In addition, 
individuals who hold a second job for financial reasons are likely to compare the available 
employment opportunities they have and choose the one with the highest potential in 
terms of earnings capacity, in accordance with the prediction of standard models of 
occupational choice (e.g. Freeman, 1971; Boskin, 1974; Berger, 1988; Montmarquette et 
al., 2002). In order to capture this decision, a new variable in the dataset has thus been 
created that compares the wages that the individual is likely to receive from his current 
occupation with the predicted earnings from the best alternative occupation. The latter is 
defined as the occupation that individuals are most likely to do as part of their primary 
employment, besides the one that they are currently employed in (see the description in 
the Appendix for details).  As expected, the estimated coefficient of this variable is 
negative and significant, suggesting that individuals who have higher earnings possibilities 
in their current occupation, relative to other viable options, are less likely to choose a 
different occupation in their second job.  
 
As shown by Shaw (1987), the degree of transferability of skills across occupations is an 
important determinant of occupational choice, with a lower degree of transferability being 
associated with a greater probability of individuals selecting similar jobs.  As discussed 
before, a measure of occupational-specific experience has thus been included in the 
regression as a control variable (Zangelidis, 2008a).  The findings confirm a priori 
expectations, as individuals with lengthier occupational experience in their primary job are 
less likely to choose a different occupation in their second job. Interestingly, accumulated 
                                                           
10
  For robustness purposes a Probit model and a Random Effects Probit model (with no selection correction) 
have also been estimated.  The results remain fairly similar across the different estimation procedures, so 
discussion only of the Linear Probability model is provided in the main text.  The regression output of the 
alternative empirical procedures is available from the authors upon request. 
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labour market experience is found to have the opposite (positive) effect.  One plausible 
explanation for the latter result may be that individuals with lengthier overall working 
experience have better knowledge of the labour market and better information regarding 
employment opportunities. Furthermore, the length of total labour market experience may 
be regarded as a proxy of the level of accumulated general, highly transferable, skills.   
 
Household characteristics are important determinants of individuals’ occupational choice in 
the second job. Specifically, married or cohabitating individuals (particularly those whose 
spouse is not employed) are estimated to be less likely to do a different occupation in their 
second job, compared to that in their primary one. This finding may be interpreted as 
evidence that individuals with increased financial commitments are more likely to choose 
as their second job an occupation that that they are familiar with, as a means of increasing 
their earnings capacity.   
 
Workplace characteristics of the primary job are also found to affect the occupational 
choice in the second job.  In particular, individuals employed in the private sector are less 
likely to do a different occupation when engaging in multiple job-holding, while the opposite 
holds for those who have promotion prospects in their primary jobs. The latter may be 
interpreted as an indication that these individuals moonlight for non-pecuniary motives. In 
addition, individuals with a low level of education, compared to those with a University 
degree or above, are found to be less likely to do a secondary occupation different to the 
one in their primary job. Finally, the majority of the individuals employed in occupations 
other than Managers and Administrators are less likely to choose a different occupation in 
their second job.  
 
Overall, the above findings imply that individuals in low-skilled jobs and/or those facing 
increased family commitments or financial constraints are more likely to select a similar 
occupation in the second job as in their primary one. This is presumably to exploit the 
higher earnings opportunities that their non-transferable occupational experience secures.  
The contrary holds for those individuals who enjoy a relative sense of financial security, 
who can therefore “afford” to select different occupational streams in their secondary 
employment that satisfy their intrinsic preferences.  
 [Insert Table 4 about here] 
3 Multiple Job-Holding and Job Mobility  
Focusing on the selection equation (10) first, particular interest is paid to the following five 
possible labour market outcomes concerning the primary employment: (1) staying in the 
same job; (2) becoming self-employed; (3) getting a new salary job; (4) getting a new 
position with the current employer; and (5) becoming unemployed or inactive. The 
estimation methodology is a random effects probit model11. Specifically, the four separate 
models estimate the probability of individuals moving to each of the four possible labour 
market outcomes (2),(3) and (4), relative to a comparison group of those who remain in the 
same job.  
 
                                                           
11
 This estimation methodology is considered superior to other alternatives, such as the multinomial probit 
model. The latter would cater for simultaneous choice between mutually exclusive options. However, that 
model does not allow the incorporation of individual random effects. Nonetheless, the results and 
interpretations from the separate four regressions shown in the next section are robust even when using a 
multinomial probit model (available from the authors upon request).  
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The estimates from the random effects probit models are presented in Table 5, Panel (A). 
In order to assess the importance of multiple job-holding in period t on the four alternative 
turnover patterns at period t+1, multiple job-holding enters the model in three alternative 
ways.  In the first specification (I) it appears as a binary variable (Moonlighter), where a 
simple control for multiple job-holding in period t is included.  In the second specification 
(II), two binary variables are included that capture simultaneously the incidence of multiple 
job-holding and the occupational discrepancy between primary and secondary jobs (i.e. 
Different occupation in 2nd job relative to the primary one in period t, and Similar 
occupation between the primary and 2nd job in period t).  Finally, in the third specification 
(III), two binary variables that reflect the persistency of dual job-holding activity are 
considered (i.e. Serial Moonlighter and Single Moonlighter )12.  The omitted category in the 
two latter specifications is those who do not have a second job at period t. The remaining 
explanatory variables are similar to Table 4.  
 
It is hence found that individuals who have a second job are more likely to become self-
employed in the next period than to remain in the same job (column A1).  The same is also 
true for getting a new job (column A2).  In addition, multiple job holding is found to 
decrease the probability of becoming unemployed or inactive, compared to remaining in 
the same job (column A4). The estimates from the second specification give rise to similar 
conclusions, with those who have a second job in period t (doing either the same or 
different occupation compared to their primary one) being more likely to becoming self-
employed or getting a new job in the next period.  The results are also fairly similar when 
employing the third specification.  Both serial and single moonlighters are found to be 
more likely to enter self-employment compared to staying in the same salary job. Single 
moonlighters are also estimated to have a higher probability of changing salary jobs, while 
the same is not true for serial moonlighters.  What becomes apparent here is that the 
incidence of multiple job-holding itself is what affects job mobility in the next period, rather 
than the occupational choices individuals make in their secondary employment, or the 
persistency of dual job-holding activity.  
 
The results on the remaining regressors are almost identical regardless of the chosen 
specification, so for that reason, and for economy of space, the estimates only from 
specification (I) are presented in Table 513. Some interesting results emerge from the 
analysis. Local unemployment is found only to reduce the probability of moving to a new 
job, while it has no significant impact on all other job mobility outcomes. Furthermore, 
individuals with lengthier accumulated seniority and labour market experience are less 
likely to exhibit any kind of job mobility.  Interestingly, job mobility appears to be a 
response to the hours-constraints individual face in their primary job. Individuals earning 
higher wages and those enjoying higher level of job satisfaction are found be less mobile 
across jobs. Also, the sector and contract of employment, as well as the promotion and 
salary prospects, and the travel to work time are estimated to play a significant role in job 
mobility outcomes.   
 [Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
4 Multiple Job-Holding and Occupational Choice in the New Job 
As the estimates in Table 5 (Panel A) highlight the importance of dual job-holding for job 
mobility, the issue is now further explored by examining the occupational choices 
                                                           
12
 The serial moonlighter is defined as an individual holding a 2nd job for 2 consecutive years, as opposed to 
the single moonlighter who exhibits a single moonlighting spell.   
13
 All estimates can be made available from the authors upon request. 
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individuals make when changing jobs (either by becoming self-employed, getting a new 
job, or obtaining a new position with their current employer).  As before, particular attention 
is paid on the effect of holding two jobs and the occupational choice in the second job.  
 
The occupational choice model in equation (9) is estimated separately for those who 
become self-employed, get a new job or a new position at period t+1, with the job mobility 
models of columns A1-A4 serving as first stage regressions that correct for the potential 
incidental truncation bias14.  Linear probability models are thus estimated in the second 
stage, incorporating the inverse Mills ratios obtained in the first stage. The dependent 
variable takes the value 1 if individuals work in a different occupation in (a) self-
employment (column B1); (b) new job with a new employer (column B2); and (c) new 
position with the same employer (column B3).  The estimates are presented in Table 5 
(Panel B). 
 
Similar to above, three alternative specifications are used in order to capture the effect of 
multiple job-holding on occupational transitions between primary employments. What 
becomes evident is that the occupational choices that individuals make as multiple job-
holders (specification II) can play an important role in terms of affecting their selected 
occupations in their new primary employment. In particular, individuals who carry out the 
same occupation in the primary and secondary job at period t are less likely to perform a 
different occupation in the new primary job at period t+1.  The opposite is true for those 
who do different occupations in their primary and secondary jobs at the previous period t.  
These findings suggest that there are human capital spill-over effects between primary and 
secondary employment.  Individuals may use multiple job-holding as a conduit for 
obtaining new skills and expertise and as a stepping stone to a new career, particularly 
one that involves self-employment.  The other two alternative specifications (I and III) 
reveal further information regarding the occupational choice in the new primary job.  
According to the first specification, multiple job-holders are more likely to do a different 
occupation that entails self-employment, compared to those who only have one job.  This 
result appears to be driven by those who are “serial moonlighters”, as can be seen by the 
findings of the third model.  
 
Due to space limitations we refrain from an extensive discussion of the remaining results, 
though some findings merit further attention.  In particular, individuals with lengthier 
occupation-specific experience are estimated to be less likely to change occupations in 
their new primary job.  This is a finding that one would expect a priori, since individuals are 
expected to enjoy larger wage premiums by performing tasks on which they have already 
accumulated the necessary skills and experience.  Also, those with higher seniority in their 
primary job at period t are more likely to do a different occupation when they get a new 
position at period t+1.  This may capture the effect of accumulated seniority on the 
probability of being promoted.  
 
For those who get a new job at the next period, the probability of deciding to do a different 
occupation than before is reduced as the local unemployment rate increases.  It appears 
that increased labour market uncertainty, as captured by the local unemployment rate, 
                                                           
14
 The exclusion restriction variables used for identification are:  private sector, permanent job, promotion 
prospects in primary job, travel to work time and annual increments.  Limited evidence of sample selection 
bias is found, with the inverse Mills ratio negative and significant only for those who get a new position.  This 
suggests that the characteristics that make individuals more likely to get a new position with their current 
employer makes them less likely also to do a different occupation in that new position.  
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deters people from pursuing different career paths and exploring new occupations. Also, 
higher earnings and job satisfaction in the previous primary job are estimated to reduce 
the probability of changing occupation once a job transition has taken place.   
Conclusion 
 
This study has investigated the inter-related dynamics of multiple job-holding, human 
capital and occupational choices between primary and secondary jobs, using a panel 
sample of UK employees from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the years 
1991-2005.  The sequential profile of the working lives of employees has been examined, 
investigating the motives of multiple job-holding, its impact on the probability of job mobility 
and the associated spillover effects on occupational transition between alternative main 
jobs.   
 
The analysis reveals that multiple job-holding, in addition to being a temporary response to 
hours-constraints, increased labour market uncertainty, and financial shocks, contains a 
permanent labour market element as it appears to be persistent over time.  The 
examination of the occupational choice in the second job also provides some interesting 
insights.  Individuals facing increased commitments or financial constraints are found to be 
more likely to do the same occupation in both their primary and secondary job, exploiting 
the higher earnings opportunities that their accumulated occupational experience may 
entail.  This result is further strengthened by the fact that individuals with lengthier 
occupational experience in their primary job are less likely to choose a different occupation 
in their second job.  Nevertheless, individuals who enjoy a relative sense of financial 
security are found to be more likely to explore different occupational paths in their 
secondary employment to satisfy their intrinsic preferences. 
 
Multiple job-holding is estimated to be an important determinant of job mobility decisions.  
Moonlighting is found to increase the probability of becoming self-employed or getting a 
new job, while it decreases the probability of becoming unemployed or inactive, compared 
to remaining in the same job.  The estimates also suggest that there are human capital 
spill-over effects between primary and secondary employment.  The occupational choices 
that individuals make as multiple job-holders play an important role in the occupational 
paths that they follow afterwards.  In particular, individuals who carry out the same 
occupation in the primary and secondary job at period t are less likely to perform a 
different occupation in the new primary job at period t+1.  The opposite is true for those 
who do different occupations in their primary and secondary jobs at the previous period t.  
The evidence provided in this study suggests that individuals may be using multiple job-
holding as a conduit for obtaining new skills and expertise and as a stepping stone to new 
careers, particularly ones that involve self-employment. 
 
From a policy point of view, the findings suggest that, depending on the motives behind 
moonlighting, different approaches with distinct priorities and objectives may be pursued. 
The evidence indicates that for more vulnerable groups of people, particularly those on low 
incomes and with low education, moonlighting may be more of a necessity rather than a 
choice. Whereas, more financially stable individuals can “afford” to use multiple job-holding 
as an avenue to develop and enrich their skills, explore alternative career paths and 
pursue possible entrepreneurial activities through self-employment. The policy priorities in 
the first case should probably focus more on strengthening job security and on 
safeguarding a stable income stream to the vulnerable segments of society. Furthermore, 
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issues related to work-life balance and overall well-being may warrant particular attention, 
since individuals who face financial hardships may be induced to compromise their 
physical and mental health when working in multiple jobs. For the second group of people, 
moonlighting may be a useful avenue through which labour market flexibility, innovation 
and entrepreneurship can be fostered. There is an increasing policy interest for nurturing 
the employability of individuals within a highly mobile and flexible labour market 
(Employment in Europe, 2004). Based on the results of this study, moonlighting is found to 
be a potential mechanism that can facilitate this process. Policy priorities could therefore 
focus on identifying ways through which multiple job-holding can lead to the more efficient 
acquisition of skills, and to promote future potential entrepreneurial initiatives.   
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Figure 1 
The Incidence of Male Dual Job-Holding and Unemployment Rates 
 
 
 
Notes:  
Moonlighting data are from the BHPS. Unemployment and Local Claimants’ rate data are 
from National Statistics Online. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics for Primary and Secondary Jobs 
 
 
Sample of paid employees in 
primary job 
Primary 
Job 
Secondary 
Job 
Number of Observations 37,772 3,211 
Number of Individuals 5,590 1,221 
Dual Job Holder 8.5% - 
Hours of Work   
   Weekly Hours (St.Dev.) 39.41 (7.6) 5.64 
(5.46) 
   Monthly Hours (St.Dev.)   169.0 
(31.9) 
24.27 
(23.5) 
Real Monthly Earnings 1,328.88 209.74 
     (St.Dev.) (877.5) (400.9) 
Self-Employed - 46.32% 
Paid Employee - 52.46% 
Different 1-digit occupation from 
primary 
- 67.3% 
Same 1-digit occupation as in primary - 32.7% 
Serial Moonlighter  61.9% 
      Occupation   
Managers & administrators 17.9%  6.94'% 
Professional occupations 10.5% 10.68'% 
Assoc. professional & technical occ. 10.7% 21.92'% 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 9.7%  3.83'% 
Craft & related occupations 18.6% 18.09'% 
Personal & protective service occ. 6.5% 18.33'% 
Sales occupations 4.6%  3.32'% 
Plant & machine operatives 14.7%  5.31'% 
Other occupations 6.9% 11.60'% 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The CER working Paper Series on Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Page 24 of 33 
 
Table 2 
Summary Statistics and Mean Differences 
 
 
Sample Employed Dual Job Holders 
Panel (A) (B) (C) 
Variable Pooled Dual-Job  Single-Job Same Different 
Real gross usual monthly earnings 1,340.8 1,229.6 1,351.3*** 1,367.7*** 1,163.1 
Hourly wage 7.50 7.19 7.54*** 7.95*** 6.82 
Low-paid group 8.3% 13.2%*** 7.9% 10.5% 14.6%*** 
Real equivalized household income 20,915.6 19,945.6 21,008.6*** 21,458.1*** 19,228.0 
Financially vulnerable group  18.0% 22.7%*** 17.6% 23.3% 22.4% 
Cohabiting/Married and partner employed  
58.0% 55.7% 
58.2%**
* 56.7% 55.3% 
Cohabiting/Married and partner not employed 
15.8% 14.9% 15.9% 
19.4%**
* 12.8% 
Single/Divorced 
26.3% 29.4%*** 25.9% 24.0% 
32.0%**
* 
Age 37.50 36.18 37.62*** 36.49 36.03 
Potential Labour Market Experience (Age-School Leaving 
Age) 
20.74 18.95 20.91*** 18.98 18.95 
Occupational Experience 11.18 10.69 11.23*** 11.37*** 10.37 
Job Tenure 5.70 5.43 5.72*** 5.79** 5.25 
High education 
17.3% 20.9%*** 16.9% 
26.0%**
* 18.4% 
Middle education 
58.8% 59.6% 58.7% 51.4% 
63.5%**
* 
Low education 
23.2% 19.0% 
23.6%**
* 
21.9%**
* 17.7% 
Usual Weekly Hours of Work 39.44 38.25 39.55*** 38.57 38.10 
Full-time job 96.5% 92.5% 96.9%*** 92.6% 92.5% 
Wants to work more hours in primary occupation 6.9% 10.5%*** 6.5% 8.4% 11.6%*** 
Wants to work the same hours in primary occupation 55.5% 55.9% 55.5% 56.9% 55.7% 
Wants to work less  hours in primary occupation 35.6% 31.3% 36.0%*** 32.4% 31.0% 
Paid Overtime hours of work 3.03 2.35 3.10*** 2.44 2.31 
Minutes traveling to work 26.05 23.72 26.27*** 24.80* 23.19 
Occupation:     Skilled Non-Manual Occupations 47.0% 47.1% 47.0% 56.9%*** 42.3% 
Skilled Manual Occupations 10.7% 11.8%** 10.6% 17.5%*** 9.1% 
Unskilled Non-Manual Occupations 20.8% 22.1%* 20.6% 14.9% 25.6%*** 
Unskilled Manual Occupations 21.6% 19.0% 21.8%*** 10.8% 23.0%*** 
Managers & administrators 17.9% 14.3% 18.2%*** 8.3% 17.2%*** 
Professional occupations 10.5% 15.2%*** 10.1% 20.6%*** 12.6% 
Assoc. professional & technical occ. 10.7% 11.8%** 10.6% 17.5%*** 9.1% 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 9.7% 8.2% 9.8%*** 3.2% 10.7%*** 
Craft & related occupations 18.6% 17.6% 18.7% 28.0%*** 12.5% 
Personal & protective service occ. 6.5% 8.9%*** 6.3% 10.2%* 8.2% 
Sales occupations 4.6% 5.0% 4.6% 1.5% 6.7%*** 
Plant & machine operatives 14.7% 11.7% 14.9%*** 5.2% 14.9%*** 
Other occupations 6.9% 7.3% 6.9% 5.6% 8.2%*** 
Job Transitions in the next year:       
Self-Employed  2.3% 4.1%*** 2.1% 4.0% 4.1% 
Paid Employee  93.6% 92.2% 93.7%*** 92.5% 92.1% 
Employed in a New Job with a New Employer  11.8% 14.2%*** 11.5% 14.1% 14.3% 
Employed in a New Position with the Same 
Employer  
13.9% 14.2% 13.9% 12.9% 14.7% 
Employed in the Same  Position with the Same 
Employer  
74.4% 71.6% 74.6%*** 73.0% 71.0% 
Unemployed  2.3% 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.0% 
Inactive 1.9% 1.7% 1.9% 1.3% 1.7% 
 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 from a t-test between mean differences.  
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Table 3: The Profile of the Dual Job-Holder 
Wooldridge Estimator: Dynamic Random Effects Probit with Mundlak terms 
Dependent Variable: Dual-Job Holder Coef.  [S.E.] M.Eff.  [S.E.] 
I. Model Specification 
Moonlighting(t-1)    1.170***  [0.046]    0.111***  [0.013] 
Moonlighting(Year1)    1.164***  [0.075]    0.107***  [0.011] 
Log(Equivalized household income)t-1   -0.114***  [0.044]   -0.004**   [0.001] 
Local unemployment rate    0.024*    [0.012]    0.001*    [0.000] 
Log(Experience) -0.151  [0.094] -0.005  [0.003] 
Log(Occupational experience) 0.011  [0.034] 0.001  [0.001] 
Log(Tenure)    0.068**   [0.026]    0.002**   [0.001] 
Wants to work more hours in primary job    0.203***  [0.072]    0.008**   [0.003] 
Wants to work the same hours in primary 
occupation 
[REF.] [REF.] 
Wants to work less hours in primary job   -0.079*    [0.044]   -0.002*    [0.001] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) -0.073  [0.105] -0.002  [0.003] 
Log(Paid overtime hours)   -0.037***  [0.012]   -0.001***  [0.000] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed -0.084  [0.074] -0.003  [0.002] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed -0.039  [0.093] -0.001  [0.003] 
Single/Divorced [REF.] [REF.] 
Log(No. of children) 0.008  [0.022] 0.001  [0.001] 
Private sector   -0.154*    [0.090] -0.005  [0.004] 
Permanent job -0.050  [0.100] -0.002  [0.004] 
Promotion prospects in primary job   -0.105**   [0.045]   -0.003**   [0.002] 
Annual increments   -0.088**   [0.044]   -0.003**   [0.001] 
High education   
Middle education 0.190  [0.204] 0.006  [0.006] 
Low education -0.142  [0.332] -0.004  [0.009] 
Managers and administrators [REF.] [REF.] 
Professional occupations 0.170  [0.105] 0.006  [0.005] 
Associate professional & technical occupations 0.119  [0.090] 0.004  [0.004] 
Clerical & secretarial occupations 0.158  [0.102] 0.006  [0.004] 
Craft & related occupations 0.157  [0.105] 0.006  [0.004] 
Personal & protective service occupations    0.365***  [0.136]    0.017*    [0.009] 
Sales occupations    0.256**   [0.123] 0.011  [0.007] 
Plant & machine operatives 0.147  [0.107] 0.005  [0.004] 
Other occupations    0.208*    [0.119] 0.008  [0.006] 
Means:  
    
Local unemployment rate   -0.045**   [0.019]   -0.001**   [0.001] 
Log(Experience) 0.166  [0.102] 0.005  [0.003] 
Log(Occupational experience)   -0.135**   [0.062]   -0.004**   [0.002] 
Log(Tenure)   -0.157***  [0.048]   -0.005***  [0.002] 
Wants to work more hours in primary job 0.160  [0.173] 0.005  [0.006] 
Wants to work the same hours in primary 
occupation 
[REF.] [REF.] 
Wants to work less hours in primary job 0.026  [0.096] 0.001  [0.003] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) -0.007  [0.185] -0.001  [0.006] 
Log(Paid overtime hours)    0.046**   [0.022]    0.001**   [0.001] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed -0.113  [0.108] -0.004  [0.003] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed   -0.391***  [0.149]   -0.013***  [0.005] 
Single/Divorced [REF.] [REF.] 
Log(No. of children)    0.073**   [0.032]    0.002**   [0.001] 
Private sector   -0.217*    [0.119]   -0.007*    [0.004] 
Permanent job   -0.547***  [0.197]   -0.018***  [0.006] 
Promotion prospects in primary job   -0.201**   [0.087]   -0.006**   [0.003] 
Annual increments -0.029  [0.090] -0.001  [0.003] 
     Constant 0.695 [0.694]   
ρ  0.435*** [0.022]   
 
    II.  Calculated Permanent Effects:  
Local unemployment rate -0.021  [0.014] -0.001  [0.000] 
Log(Experience) 0.016  [0.045] 0.001  [0.001] 
Log(Occupational experience)   -0.123**   [0.052]   -0.004**   [0.002] 
Log(Tenure)   -0.090**   [0.040]   -0.003**   [0.001] 
Wants to work more hours in primary job    0.363**   [0.156]    0.012**   [0.005] 
Table 3 continued in next page 
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Table 3 continued from last page 
Wants to work the same hours in primary 
occupation 
[REF.] [REF.] 
Wants to work less hours in primary job -0.054  [0.085] -0.002  [0.003] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) -0.081  [0.153] -0.003  [0.005] 
Log(Paid overtime hours) 0.009  [0.019] 0.001  [0.001] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed   -0.197**   [0.078]   -0.006**   [0.003] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed   -0.430***  [0.114]   -0.014***  [0.004] 
Single/Divorced [REF.] [REF.] 
Log(No. of children)    0.082***  [0.023]    0.003***  [0.001] 
Private sector   -0.372***  [0.076]   -0.012***  [0.003] 
Permanent job   -0.597***  [0.174]   -0.019***  [0.006] 
Promotion prospects in primary job   -0.306***  [0.075]   -0.010***  [0.002] 
Annual increments -0.116  [0.079] -0.004  [0.003] 
     Average Predicted Probability                             0.0425 
     No. of Observations                                       28,851 
No. of Individuals                                        5,220 
Log Likelihood                                            -5,111.3 
Wald χ2                                                     1,993.0*** 
LR χ2 (ρ=0) 513.25*** 
 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The specification also includes a constant term and the means of all independent 
variables; The coefficients and standard errors of the permanent effects are derived from tests of the linear 
constraint that the summation of the level and the mean effect of each variable are equal to zero, e.g. K(Local 
Unemployment Rate)+4(Local Unemployment Rate]=0. 
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Table 4 
Dual Job Holding and Occupational Choice 
 
Dep. Var.: Different 1-digit SOC between 1st and 2nd 
job 
Linear Probability Model 
Coef. [B.S.E.] 
Difference in hourly wage (primary occ. vs. next best)   -0.092***  [0.030] 
Local unemployment rate 0.005  [0.008] 
Log (Equivalised annual household income)t-1 -0.041  [0.025] 
Log(Experience)    0.050***  [0.015] 
Log(Occupational experience)   -0.047***  [0.014] 
Log(Tenure) 0.013  [0.011] 
Wants to work more hours in primary job 0.030  [0.032] 
Wants to work the same hours in primary occupation [REF.] 
Wants to work less hours in primary job -0.017  [0.020] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) -0.052  [0.041] 
Log(Paid overtime hours)   -0.009*    [0.005] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse employed   -0.082***  [0.025] 
Cohabiting/Married and spouse not employed   -0.214***  [0.037] 
Single/Divorced [REF.] 
Log(No. of children) -0.006  [0.008] 
Private Sector   -0.054**   [0.027] 
Permanent job 0.034  [0.048] 
Promotion prospects in primary job    0.060***  [0.021] 
Annual increments -0.009  [0.021] 
High education  [REF.] 
Middle education 0.033  [0.030] 
Low education   -0.105***  [0.039] 
Managers and administrators [REF.] 
Professional occupations   -0.296***  [0.039] 
Associate professional & technical occupations   -0.323***  [0.037] 
Clerical & secretarial occupations -0.029  [0.037] 
Craft & related occupations   -0.331***  [0.034] 
Personal & protective service occupations   -0.276***  [0.041] 
Sales occupations 0.027  [0.039] 
Plant & machine operatives    0.055*    [0.032] 
Other occupations -0.057  [0.043] 
Mills Ratio 0.055  [0.051] 
Constant    1.211***  [0.283] 
   No. of Observations                                       2,364 
No. of Individuals                                        919            
No. of Observations (1st stage equation)                                       36,980          
Log Likelihood                                            -1,365.7 
Wald χ2                                                      634.7*** 
Notes:  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
The specification includes year fixed effects and a constant term. Bootstrapped standard 
errors in Columns (1) and (2), based on 1,000 replications. The estimates presented are 
from 2nd stage regressions. The 1st stage is a selection equation as proposed by 
Wooldridge (1995) and Semykina and Wooldridge (2005). The reference groups remain 
the same as in Table 3. 
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Table 5 
Job Mobility, Occupational Choice, and Dual Job Holding 
 
 
 
Sample 
(A) Random Effects Probit 
 
Employedt 
(B) Linear Probability Model 
with selectivity correction 
Job Switchers 
Dependent Variable: Mobilityt+1 into:  Different occupation in:   
 (A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (B1) (B2) (B3) 
 
Self-Emp. New Job New  Position 
Not  
Employed 
Self-
Emp. New Job 
New 
Position 
Multiple Job-Holding (three alternative specifications) 
(I)  Moonlighter 
   0.014***    0.017**  0.009   -0.007**  0.091 -0.009 -0.014 
  [0.003]  [0.007]  [0.008]  [0.003]  [0.057]  [0.027]  [0.027] 
(II)  Different occupation in 2nd Job 
   0.013**     0.029**  0.015 -0.007   -0.219***   -0.131*** -0.068 
  [0.005]  [0.013]  [0.015]  [0.005]  [0.077]  [0.044]  [0.044] 
  Similar occupation between 2nd 
Job    0.015*** 0.011 0.006   -0.007*      0.248*** 0.05 0.009 
  [0.004]  [0.008]  [0.010]  [0.004]  [0.064]  [0.034]  [0.032] 
(III) Serial moonlighter 
   0.015*** -0.001 0.009   -0.010**     0.204*** 0.004 0.018 
  [0.005]  [0.010]  [0.012]  [0.004]  [0.077]  [0.044]  [0.037] 
Temporary moonlighter    0.015***    0.029*** 0.007 -0.004 0.051 -0.02 -0.043 
  [0.004]  [0.010]  [0.011]  [0.004]  [0.072]  [0.034]  [0.038] 
Remaining regressors based on (I) specification 
Local unemployment rate -0.001   -0.007*** -0.002 -0.001 0.019   -0.019** 0.001 
  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.019]  [0.008]  [0.007] 
Log(Real gross monthly earnings) -0.001   -0.035*** -0.001   -0.018*** -0.004   -0.121*** -0.015 
  [0.001]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.003]  [0.047]  [0.023]  [0.019] 
Job satisfaction   -0.002***   -0.027***   -0.014***   -0.008***   -0.047***   -0.021***   -0.016*** 
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.001]  [0.015]  [0.006]  [0.006] 
Log(Experience) -0.001   -0.034***   -0.039*** -0.002 0.045 -0.02 -0.002 
  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.032]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Log(Occupational experience) 0.001 0.002 0.001    0.005***   -0.083***   -0.076***   -0.072*** 
  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.002]  [0.027]  [0.013]  [0.012] 
Log(Tenure)   -0.004***   -0.061***   -0.043***   -0.007*** -0.025 0.02    0.028*** 
  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.001]  [0.023]  [0.013]  [0.011] 
Wants to work more hours in primary 
job 0.003    0.019**     0.025**  -0.003   -0.131*    -0.067** 0.042 
  [0.002]  [0.008]  [0.010]  [0.004]  [0.077]  [0.030]  [0.029] 
Wants to work same hours in primary 
job {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
 Wants to work less hours in primary 
job -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.01 0.007 -0.004 
  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.002]  [0.044]  [0.019]  [0.017] 
Log(Weekly hours in primary job) 0.001    0.056***   -0.021*    -0.015*** -0.018 -0.026   -0.067*  
  [0.002]  [0.010]  [0.013]  [0.005]  [0.070]  [0.042]  [0.039] 
Log(Paid overtime hours)   -0.001*** 0.001 0.002   -0.002*** -0.004 0.005   -0.007*  
  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.011]  [0.004]  [0.004] 
Log(Number of minutes to work) 0.001    0.008***    0.006**     0.004*** - - - 
  [0.001]  [0.002]  [0.003]  [0.001] 
Private sector    0.008***    0.044***    0.011*  0.004 - - - 
  [0.001]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.003] 
Permanent job   -0.028***   -0.197***   -0.119***   -0.140*** - - - 
  [0.008]  [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.017] 
Promotion prospects   -0.006***   -0.019***    0.052***   -0.011*** - - - 
  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.002] 
Receives annual increments   -0.006***   -0.016*** -0.005   -0.009*** - - - 
  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.005]  [0.002] 
Mills Ratio - - - - 0.043 0.009   -0.069*** 
  [0.041]  [0.021]  [0.022] 
ρ 0.270*** 0.101*** 0.103*** 0.240*** - - - 
 [0.021] [0.014] [0.012] [0.022]                   
        Observed Probability 0.2490 0.1328 0.1562 0.0411 
Predicted Probability                                    0.0140 0.1228 0.1430 0.0545 
Number of Observations                                            21,751 24,456 25,134 22,432 558 3,358 4,011 
Number of Individuals                                    4,729 4,975 4,968 4,872 487 1,991 2,226 
Uncensored Observations - - - - 22,421 25,553 26,197 
Log-Likelihood                                           -2,262.2 -7,811.6 -9,890.1 -4,104.1 -333.8 -2,313.4 -2,686.6 
The CER working Paper Series on Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Page 29 of 33 
 
Wald χ2                                                    355.0***   2433.5***  1,318.8***    886.6***    248.3***    260.6***    362.1*** 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. (A1)-(A4) present marginal effects and standard errors from a random effects 
probit model. (B1)-(B3) show coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors from a linear probability model (based on 
1,000 replications). The specifications also include marital status, number of children, partner’s employment status 
and dummy variables for: Occupation {9}; Education {3}; Wave {15}, and a constant term. The significance of the ρ-
term is given from a LR test that ρ =0.  
 
Appendix:  
 
A.1 Calculation of the difference in earnings (primary occupation vs. next best alternative) 
variable 
The best alternative occupation is detected based on an equation describing the 
occupational choice in the second job, using a multinomial probit model. Specifically, we 
let 71L denote the individual occupational choice of the second job, where 71L can take the 
unordered multinomial values j = {0,1,...,9} reflecting the 9 different 1-digit SOC groups. 
We then investigate how the set of conditioning variables M  N7L, "O, where 7L  is the 
occupation of the individual in the primary job and " captures other demographic and 
primary job-specific variables, affect the probability of secondary-job selection, P71L 
Q|M), ceteris paribus. 
 
Based on the estimates of this model, the predicted probabilities of occupational choice in 
the second job, conditional on the occupation of the primary job, are shown in Table A1. 
The best alternative occupations can be easily obtained by looking across each row of 
Table A1 and selecting the cell with the highest predicted probability, excluding the 
elements of the diagonal. In doing so, it is evident that, for example, the best alternative 
occupation in the secondary job for those currently employed as Managers or 
Administrators in their primary job is an Associated Professional and Technical occupation.  
 
Utilizing the information of Table A1, the predicted wages from the best alternative 
occupation are hence calculated based on an hourly wage equation model: 
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ARS  '
′ K  T7L  U  (A1) 
where, for instance, the predicted wage for Managers or Administrators (SOC code 1) is 
obtained as ARSV  '′ KW  TW7X, which is the wage the individuals would receive if 
they were employed in the next best category of Associated Professional and Technical 
occupation instead (SOC code 3).     
The difference in the earnings capacity between the current and the best alternative 
occupation is thus calculated as the difference between the wages received from the 
current occupation in the primary job and the predicted wages from the best alternative 
occupation in the second job. 
 
Table A1 
Occupational Transitions between 1st and 2nd job: Predicted Probabilities 
 
 
BHPS, Waves 1-15 
 
                                              2nd 
Job 
1st Job 
Group 
1 
Manag. 
Group 2 
Profess. 
Group 
3 
Associat
e 
Group 
4 
Clerical 
Group 
5 
Craft 
Group 
6 
Personal 
Group 
7 
Sales 
Group 
8 
Plant 
Group 
9 
Other 
 
Group Managers & administrators 19.1 13.0% 23.5 6.2% 8.1% 16.7 2.8% 4.0% 6.7% 
Group Professional occupations 8.0% 36.7% 34.3 2.7% 3.8% 5.4% 2.6% 2.1% 4.4% 
Group Assoc. professional & technical 7.7% 7.0% 46.2 9.3% 10.8 7.6% 4.6% 1.8% 5.2% 
Group Clerical & secretarial occupations 2.0% 3.0% 20.6 15.9 13.9 20.3 3.5% 5.3% 15.6
Group Craft & related occupations 3.0% 0.7% 9.8% 0.3% 54.3 13.7 0.8% 6.1% 11.4
Group Personal & protective service occ. 5.8% 3.1% 9.9% 1.4% 8.2% 40.2 4.9% 10.4 16.0
Group Sales occupations 17.9 1.5% 26.3 4.4% 11.4 16.1 10.0 1.7% 10.8
Group Plant & machine operatives 2.6% 0.2% 21.0 3.0% 13.5 26.4 2.6% 15.8 15.0
Group Other occupations 8.5% 0.7% 11.4 2.6% 21.8 22.8 3.2% 7.5% 21.7
 
Notes:  
The Table consists of predicted probabilities of 2nd job occupational choice, conditional on 1st job occupational choice, 
based on estimates of a Multinomial Probit model (available from the authors upon request).   
 
